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Abstract
Understanding the mechanism through which ﬁnancial globalization aﬀect eco-
nomic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of opening ﬁnancial
markets. This paper is a ﬁrst attempt at disentangling the eﬀects of ﬁnancial inte-
gration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP)
and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries observed
between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that ﬁnancial integration has a positive
direct eﬀect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some de-
lay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise in productivity. I control for indirect
eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization through banking crises. Such episodes depress both
investments and TFP, though they are triggered by ﬁnancial integration only to a
minor extent. The paper also provides a discussion of a simple model on the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial integration, and shows additional empirical evidence supporting it.
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11 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
globalization on growth.1 The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions
has on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for
triggering ﬁnancial instability and banking crises. Yet, this debate has not addressed
empirically the mechanism through which ﬁnancial liberalization aﬀects growth. How do
the main sources of growth - total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation -
react to ﬁnancial globalization? This issue is of particular relevance for at least two reasons.
First, understanding how TFP and investments are aﬀected by ﬁnancial liberalization
would allow us to identify which models are more appropriate to analyze and predict
t h ee c o n o m i ce ﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization. Second, answering the question above
would greatly help understand the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) show that, whether capital or TFP react to ﬁnancial openness, matters
signiﬁcantly for the size of welfare gains (or losses).2 There are, to my knowledge, no
studies that address this important issue. This paper is a ﬁr s ta t t e m p ta td i s e n t a n g l i n g
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization on productivity and capital accumulation.
The theoretical literature proposes various mechanisms through which ﬁnancial glob-
alization may aﬀect economic performance. In a standard neo-classical framework, open-
ing international capital markets generates capital ﬂows from capital-abundant towards
capital-scarse countries, thereby aﬀecting growth in the poor countries through an acce-
laration in the convergence process. This eﬀect however is short-lived, since the steady
state (or the balanced growth path) is not aﬀected. This argument would ﬁnd empirical
support if capital accumulation in poor countries accelerated after ﬁnancial liberalization,
and TFP did not react. If credit rationing were added to the neo-classical framework
above, also productivity might be expected to increase, to the extent that capital inﬂows
make more productive investments possible by relieving the economy from credit con-
s t r a i n t s( a si nA c e m o g l ua n dZ i l i b o t t i ,1997). The ﬁndings (e.g. in Lucas, 1990) that
capital does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries though, seems to make these mechanisms
less likely to apply. International capital mobility may also allow investors to diversify
risks by holding foreign assets, as suggested by Obstfeld (1994). Better portfolio insurance
fosters investments in risky projects with high expected productivity, as well as savings.
1Here ﬁnancial globalization is meant to be the absence of restrictions to international ﬁnancial trans-
actions. Henceforth, I will equivalently refer to it as (international) ﬁnancial liberalization, ﬁnancial
integration, or ﬁnancial openness.
2Their quantitative exercise points out that the beneﬁts from an acceleration in capital accumulation
along the convergence to the steady state, are way smaller (up to a ﬁftieth) than the gains from an
improvement in productivity, hence in the steady state to which the economy converges.
2While higher savings would imply a positive eﬀect on capital accumulation, the outcome
of international portfolio reallocation on capital and productivity would vary across coun-
tries, hence be undetermined on aggregate. Yet another approach could be considering
ﬁnancial globalization similar to trade in goods. By exerting a pro-competitive eﬀect on
the capital markets, ﬁnancial openness would induce ﬁrms of all countries to use capi-
tal more eﬃciently, thereby raising productivity without necessarily causing capital ﬂows
across countries. As trade in goods, ﬁnancial integration might also foster specialization
in ﬁnancial services, which would improve allocative eﬃciency by allowing good ﬁrms to
borrow at better conditions through foreign intermediaries. Also, by giving ﬁrms access
t oaw i d e rr a n g eo fﬁnancial services, integration may allow them to use the most appro-
priate ones, thereby gaining in eﬃciency. Capital accumulation might eventually follow
the increase in productivity.
All of these models support the view that ﬁnancial integration aﬀects positively eco-
nomic performance. However, in a world characterized by market imperfections and weak
institutions, ﬁnancial integration could open the door to speculation, misallocation of cap-
ital and ﬁnancial instability (as for instance in Rodrick, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000), thereby
aﬀecting negatively economic performance.
The models above give diﬀerent predictions on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization
on productivity and capital accumulation. In general, if openness only fosters capital
accumulation, with a sort of acceleration in convergence, its positive eﬀect is expected
to be short-lived. If instead it raises TFP, it is most likely to spur long-term growth.
Understanding what model is supported by the empirical evidence may be of great help
to ﬁgure out if ﬁnancial globalization has temporary or long-lasting eﬀects on the wealth
of nations.
To better understand the mechanism through which international ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion aﬀects capital accumulation and TFP, I also control for two indirect channels. First,
ﬁnancial globalization may foster ﬁnancial development (see Klein and Olivei, 1999), i.e.
the availability of external ﬁnance to the private sector, which Beck et al. (2000) show
to aﬀect positively productivity but not investments.3 Including a measure of ﬁnancial
depth, such as the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP, allows me to disentangle
the importance of this channel.
As another indirect channel, ﬁnancial liberalization may trigger ﬁnancial instability
and banking crises, as a wide literature points out (see Aizenman, 2001 for a survey on
3Financial development can be deﬁned as the ability of a ﬁnancial system to reduce information asym-
metries between investors and borrowers, trade and diversify risk, mobilize and pool savings, and ease
transactions. Removing restrictions on international ﬁnancial transactions (ﬁnancial liberalization) may
aﬀect the way a ﬁnancial system carries over its functions, hence ﬁnancial development.
3the evidence on ﬁnancial liberalization and crises). Whatever the mechanism generating
banking crises, such events may harm the ability of a ﬁnancial system to provide the
economy with credit. As a consequence, both investments in physical capital and inno-
vation can be expected to slow down. In the worst scenario, TFP might even drop, due
to the need for shutting down productive projects. I account for the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
instability by controlling all regressions for an indicator of banking crises. In this way,
any indirect eﬀect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for the
index of ﬁnancial liberalization. I also estimate the joint eﬀect of crises and liberalization
to assess whether open capital account eases or worsens the recovery from bank crashes.
Before going through these estimations, I explicitely address endogeneity between ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises by means of multinomial logit regressions.
I follow three methodologies to assess the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking
crises on investments and productivity, and a fourth to address the link between liberal-
ization and crises. Using de iure indicators of ﬁnancial integration, I perform diﬀerence
in diﬀerences estimation of the impact of regime switches, between capital restrictions
and openness, and between crises and normal times. To this end, I use a panel data with
yearly observations from at most 93 countries over the period 1975-1999. I then turn to the
long-run analysis and estimate equations for TFP and capital growth rates as a function
of initial productivity and capital stock respectively, ﬁnancial globalization and the other
controls over a period of 25 year in a sample of 85 countries. To overcome problems of
unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects and endogeneity of regressors, typical of cross-sectional
estimates, I adopt the system GMM dynamic panel technique proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). To assess whether ﬁnancial liberalization
favors the occurrence of banking crises, I estimate on the annual panel dataset a series of
linear probability models for an indicator distinguishing between systemic and borderline
crises (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 2002).
The main results are the following. (1)I n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁnancial liberalization has a
positive direct eﬀect on TFP, while it has no direct eﬀect on capital accumulation. (2)
Financial integration has a positive, lagged eﬀect on capital, since investments follow
TFP. (3) Banking crises harm both capital accumulation and productivity. (4) Financial
liberalization raises only the probability that minor banking crises occur in developed
countries.
This paper is mainly related to three strands of literature. The literature on growth
and development accounting has shown that a large share of cross-country diﬀerences in
economic performance is driven by total factor productivity (TFP) rather than factor
4accumulation (physical and human capital).4 Hall and Jones (1999) point out that a
substantial share of the variation in GDP per worker is explained by diﬀerences in TFP
and provide evidence that productivity is to a large extent determined by institutional
factors. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that also GDP growth diﬀerentials are
mainly accounted for by diﬀerences in the growth rates of TFP. These results suggest that,
if ﬁnancial globalization is to aﬀect the wealth of nations, it is more likely to do it through
its impact on TFP, rather than factor accumulation. This is indeed the main empirical
result of the paper.
Several authors suggest that ﬁnancial development spurs GDP growth by fostering
productivity growth, not only by raising the funds available for accumulation. Theoretical
papers by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer (2005b) among others show that ﬁnancial development may relieve
risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through technological
change. While earlier contributions (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) suggest that
ﬁnancial development fosters growth simply by increasing participation in production and
risk pooling, in the later works the relationship is also driven by advances in productivity.
King and Levine (1993), and, in more detail, Beck Levine and Loayza (2000) show evidence
of a strong eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on TFP growth, and only a tenuous eﬀect on
physical capital accumulation.
Many papers, extensively summarized in Prasad et al. (2003 and 2006) address the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization on economic growth and volatility, from diﬀerent perspec-
tives and with various datasets and empirical methodologies. Some studies (for instance,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, Kraay, 2000 and Rodrick, 1998) found that ﬁnancial liber-
alization does not aﬀect growth, others that the eﬀect is positive (Levine, 2001,B e k a e r te t
al., 2003 and Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino, 2004), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen
and Leblang, 2003). These eﬀects are also shown to be heterogeneous across countries at
diﬀerent stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al, 2003, Chinn
and Ito, 2003 and Edwards, 2001) and countries with diﬀerent macroeconomic frameworks
(Arteta Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001). Perhaps surprisingly, very little evidence exists
on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization on the main sources of growth: productivity and
capital accumulation. Chari and Henry (2002) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of equity market lib-
eralization on investments and the Tobin’s Q of listed ﬁrms, and conclude that these must
be driven by changes in productivity, which they do not explore directly though. Another
call for studies on ﬁnancial integration and productivity is in Prasad et al. (2006).
4See Caselli (2005) for a survey on the develpment accounting literature, and Easterly and Levine (2001)
for the stylized facts on development and growth accounting.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
on growth and development accounting, which leads on to the discussion of my empirical
strategy. In section 3, I describe the dataset, with particular attention to the indicators
of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises, as well as the construction of the data for
physical capital and TFP. Section 4 presents the econometric methodologies, and section 5
reports the results from the estimation of the equations for investments and TFP. Section
6 discusses a simple model that explains the evidence in the previous sections and is
consistent with further empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes.
2 The empirical strategy
The literature on growth and developing accounting takes as starting point the Cobb
Douglas speciﬁcation for the aggregate production function,
Y = AKα (HL)
1−α , (1)
where K is the aggregate capital stock, L the number of workers and H their average
human capital. The term A represents the eﬃciency in the use of factors, and corresponds
to the notion of total factor productivity (TFP). Several contributions on development
accounting (see Caselli, 2005 for a survey and Hall and Jones, 1999) have shown that a
large share of the cross-country variation in GDP per worker, Y
L, is explained by diﬀerences
in A. The works on growth accounting (see Easterly and Levine, 2001 and Klenow and


















have shown that also cross-country diﬀerentials in GDP growth are to a large extent
generated by diﬀerentials in productivity growth (
˙ A
A).
All studies on the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth have focused on the left
hand side of (2), estimating various versions of the equation:
dyit = b0 + b1yit−1 + b0
2Zit + b3IFLit + eit, (3)
where dyit ≡ dlog(Yit) i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fG D Pi nc o u n t r yi, yit−1 is the logaritm
of lagged GDP, Zit is a vector of control variables, IFLit is an indicator of ﬁnancial
liberalization, and eit is the error term.
This paper instead considers the right hand side of (2) and proposes estimates of the
6following equation:
Pit = β0 + β0
1Xit + γIFLit + uit,
where Pit represents in turn A, K or their growth rates in country i at time t, X is a vector
of control variables, IFL the indicator of ﬁnancial integration, and u the error term.
3T h e d a t a
I perform the analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset with annual observations for 93
countries, spanning from 1975 to 1999. Depending on the econometric methodology in
use, I consider, in turn, the whole yearly panel, a cross-section of 85 countries with data
averaged over the sample period, and a panel comprising up to 91 countries with ﬁve-year
observations over the same period. As Table A shows, the largest sample includes twenty-
two developed and seventy-one developing countries from all continents. The following
subsections describe the main variables I include in the regressions.
3.1 Control variables
When assessing the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on capital accumulation and produc-
tivity, I control for a number of variables.
• Initial real per capita GDP (rgdpch from the PWT 6.1) accounts for diﬀerent stages
of economic development. It is often claimed that richer countries are more likely to
have open ﬁnancial markets, hence the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization might seem
spurious if initial GDP is not controlled for. If adding this variable to the regressions
does not take away signiﬁcance from the coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial liberalization, the
suspects of spuriousness are less sound.
• I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1)i n
the regressions for capital accumulation. Several theories predict that government
expenditure crowds out private investments. If this is the case, I should expect a
negative coeﬃcient in the equation for capital accumulation.
• Financial depth, as proxied by the ratio of total credit to the private sector over GDP
(privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate give a measure of
the external ﬁnance available to ﬁrms. Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001)
show that ﬁnancial liberalization promotes ﬁnancial development, which, according
to Beck et al. (2000), may be expected to foster productivity more than capital
accumulation. Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino (2004) also ﬁnd that banking crises have a
negative eﬀect on privo, mainly where institutions are weak.
7Controlling for ﬁnancial depth in the equations for both investments and productivity
helps disentangle the direct eﬀect of liberalization and crises from the indirect one
through ﬁnancial development. A recent literature on ﬁnancial fragility points out
that crises may come along as by-products of sustained growth of the ﬁnancial system
(see Ranciere et al., 2004 and Tornell et al., 2004). Feijen and Perotti (2005) suggest
that equilibria with ﬁnancial fragility and high participation in the ﬁnancial market
may arise where political accountability is not very high and wealth inequality is
high. Including privo and its growth rate in the logit regressions for banking crises
allows me to test a reduced form of these theoretical predictions.
• I control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of GDP
(openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may aﬀect the eﬃciency of an economy through
several channels, such as specialization according to comparative advantage, access
to larger markets with more product variety and increased competition. These
eﬀects may in turn stimulate both capital accumulation and productivity growth.
However, the impact of trade may also depend on the distance of a country to the
world technology frontier, as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Aghion,
Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005).
• Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by giving
incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr)b yG i n a r t e
and Park (1997), which is available for ﬁve-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
• Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) show that the existence of explicit deposit
insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and thus crises of the banking sector.
Hence, I include a measure of deposit insurance (depins) from Demirguc-Kunt and
Sobaci (2000) in the logit analysis for banking crises.
• I also control for inﬂation (from the World Development Indicators) in the logit for
banking crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad macroeconomic policies,
which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
• Finally, I use indicators of economic and institutional development to check for
heterogeneity in the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on both
investments and productivity. In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth I ex-
plicitely control for institutional quality using the Government Anti-Diversion Policy
index (gadp, from Hall and Jones, 1999) as a proxy. As an indicator of economic
development, I construct a dummy (developing)t h a tt a k e sv a l u e1 if the country
is deﬁned as low or middle-low income in the World Development Indicators, and 0
8otherwise. In the panel regressions, I use these indicators to split the sample and
construct interactive terms.
3.2 Financial integration
Ip r o x yﬁnancial integration with a 0-1 indicator, which relies on de iure criteria. The
variable IFL is a dummy that takes value 0 if a country has held restrictions on capital
account transactions during the year, and 1 otherwise. The existence of restrictions is
classiﬁed on a 0-1 basis by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which is available for a maximum of 212c o u n t r i e s
over the period 1967- 1996.5 This is the most commonly used indicator of international
ﬁnancial liberalization.
For robustness check, I will also use another de iure indicator, that relies on the
chronology of oﬃcial equity market liberalization, available in Bekaert et al. (2003) for
95 countries from 1980 onwards. It takes value 1 if international equity trading is allowed
in a given country-year, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable, EML,d i ﬀers from IFL
because it only accounts for equity market liberalization and not, for instance, credit
market liberalization. As opposed to IFL, it does not allow for policy reversals: it labels
a country as open ever since its ﬁr s ty e a ro fl i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
Factors aﬀecting capital accumulation and productivity may also inﬂuence the decision
of a country to liberalize ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, there may be countries adopting
such reforms either after reaching certain levels of investments and productivity, or with
the purpose to attain them. This may raise concerns of omitted variables bias or even
endogeneity, when estimating the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on capital accumulation




where IFL_rit is an indicator of the reforms observed in country i at time t,a n dXit
is a set of covariates. IFL_r equals 0 if there are no reforms, 1 if a switch into capital
account liberalization occurs, -1 if the switch is out of it. The estimation is performed with
a multinomial logit.6 All standard errors are robust and clustered by country. Following
5Classiﬁcation methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly
be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classiﬁcations, though for a
limited number of countries, and over a short time span.
6All results are robust to the use of logit and probit on separate indicators: IFL_in (1 for switches
into capital account liberalization, and 0 otherwise) and IFL_out (1 for switches out of capital account
liberalization, and 0 otherwise).
9Bekaert et al. (2003), I include among the covariates a measure of institutional quality
(gadp), and the lagged values of real per capita GDP (rgdpch), government expenditure
(kg), openness to trade (openk), ﬁnancial depth (privo), inﬂation, per capita GDP growth,
capital stock (k) and TFP(a). I also control for the occurrence of banking crises in the
previous year (BC), economic development (developing) and continental dummies.
The results in Table B show the geographical component to capture reforms the most.
Both inﬂation and ﬁnancial development reduce the likelihood that ﬁnancial restrictions
are removed. Neither the initial stock of capital nor the level of productivity are associated
to switches into and out of ﬁnancial liberalization, suggesting that endogeneity of ﬁnancial
integration with respect to capital and productivity may be not a major concern. The
occurrence of banking crises does not seem to aﬀect signiﬁcantly the decision to abandon,
nor to adopt, restrictions on international capital transactions.
3.3 Banking crises
Banking crises are subject to various classiﬁcations. I adopt a zero-one anecdotal indicator
of bank crises, proposed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who keep record of 117s y s t e m i c
and 51 non-systemic crises occurring in 93 and 45 countries respectively, from the late
1970’s and onwards. On a yearly base, the variable BC takes value 2 or 1 if the country
has experienced a systemic or borderline banking crisis, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Caprio and Kilingebiel label a crisis as systemic if a great deal or all of a bank’s capital
has been exhausted and borderline if the losses were less severe. To make this deﬁnition
criterion clearer, I refer to a few episodes. The 1991 crisis in Sweden as well as the 1998-99
crisis in Russia were systemic, since they involved insolvency or serious diﬃculties for 90
and 45 per cent of the banking system, respectively. The isolated failures of three UK
banks between the eighties and the nineties, as well as the solvency problems of Credit
Lyonnais in France in 1994-95, are instead labled as borderline crises.
Before going through the analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on the sources
of growth, I address endogeneity between banking crises and ﬁnancial liberalization, by




The variable BC_typeit takes value one if a banking crisis of a given type (systemic,
borderline, or any) has occurred in country i at time t.T h ev e c t o rXit includes a series of
covariates, and IFLit is the binary indicator of international ﬁnancial liberalization. To
appreciate the eﬀects of all covariates, I also estimate a multinomial logit for BCit,w h i c h
10takes values 1 and 2 in case of borderline and systemic crises respectively, and zero when
no crises occur. I cluster the standard errors by country.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table C report the results for BC_all,w h i c he q u a l s1 if
any type of crisis has occurred, and 0 otherwise. The indicator of IFL has no signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient estimates on the full sample. The variables raising the likelihood of crises the
most are high inﬂation and the existence of explicit deposit insurance, as already shown
by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). High real GDP per capita and growth rate
of ﬁnancial depth signiﬁcantly reduce the probability of crisis. The ﬁrst result is in line
with the predictions in Martin and Rey (2004), while the second seems to contraddict the
“bumpy path” hypothesis proposed by Ranciere et al. (2004) and Tornell et al. (2004).
Splitting the sample between developed and developing countries, I ﬁnd that IFL has
ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on the likelihood of banking crises in developed countries, while the
growth rate of private credit and the existence of depisit insurance are more important in
developing countries.
In Table C1, I exploit the classiﬁcation in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and estimate
the eﬀects of all covariates on systemic versus borderline banking crises. IFL only has
a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of borderline banking crises in developed countries.
This positive coeﬃcient is explained by the fact that most banking crises in developed
countries are borderline. Deposit insurance, high real per capita GDP and the growth
rate of ﬁnancial depth mainly aﬀect the probability of systemic crises. High inﬂation has
opposite eﬀects on the likelihood of the two types of crises: negative for borderline and
positive for systemic crises.
Table C2 reports the marginal eﬀects on the likelihood of banking crises estimated
with dprobit. The coeﬃcients in columns 4 and 5 mean that ﬁnancial liberalization raises
by 0.3 to 1.7 per cent the probability that a border line banking crisis arises.
3.4 Capital accumulation
I construct the series of the physical capital stocks, K, and its growth rate, dk, applying
the perpetual inventory method as in Hall and Jones (1999) on data from the Penn World
Tables 6.1. I estimate the initial stock of capital, Kt0 as
It0
g+δ, where g is the average
geometric growth rate of total investments between t0 and t0+1 0 .7 In the paper t0 is
1960, since I have data on investments dating back to that year for most countries.8 A
depreciation rate δ of 6 per cent in ten years is assumed. The later values of the capital
stock are easily computed as Kt =( 1 − δ)Kt−1+ It.
7Investments are deﬁned as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1.
8I nt h ec o u n t r i e sw h i c hh a v en od a t af o r1960 t0 is the ﬁr s ty e a rf o l l o w e db ya tl e a s t15o b s e r v a t i o n s .
113.5 Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following the Hall and Jones (1999)





where Yi is the output produced in country i, Ki is the stock of physical capital in use,
Ai is labor-augenting productivity, Li is the labor in use (rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the
PWT 6.1), and Hi is a measure of the average human capital of workers (HiLi is therefore
human capital-augmented labor).9 The factor share α is assumed constant across countries
and equal to 1/3, which matches national account data for developed countries. I adopt
the following speciﬁcation for labor-augmenting human capital as a function of the years
of schooling, si:
Hi = eφ(si).
I rely on the results of Psacharopulos’ (1994) survey and specify φ(si) as a piecewise linear
function with coeﬃcients 0.134 for the ﬁrst four years of education, 0.101 for the next four
years, and 0.068 for any value of si > 8.
Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from












4 Econometric specifications and methodologies
In the next sections, I follow various methodologies to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises on the sources of growth. First, I fully exploit the cross-
sectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and estimate
Pit = β0 + β0
1Xit−1 + γIFLit−1 + δBCit−1 + ηi + νt + εit, (4)
where Pit is a proxy for the outcome variable (either dlog(K), dlog(A) or log(A) in the
variuos speciﬁcations) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables, IFL is
ad u m m yf o rﬁnancial liberalization and BC an indicator of banking crises. To reduce
problems with simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. ηi is a country-
9In Hall and Jones (1999) Yi is rgdpch*pop from the PWT, net of the value-added of the mining
industry. Following Caselli (2005), I simplify and take rgdpch*pop.
12speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are speciﬁct o
i. Its inclusion in (4) implies that γ is only estimated from the within-country variation
around the liberalization date. The ﬁxed year eﬀects (νt) allow me to compare the change
in P between the pre and post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the
change in the countries that maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (4)
is a “diﬀerence in diﬀerences” (D-i-D) speciﬁcation, since it implies diﬀerencing out the
time-mean for each i, and the common trend for all i’s at any t.
Two main problems may undermine the ability of γ to identify a causal link from
ﬁnancial liberalization to the sources of growth. First, there may be concerns about the
selection of the countries that liberalized. As the results in Table B suggest, geographical
location is a good predictor for reforms on international capital transactions. Suppose
there are fewer liberalization episodes among countries of a certain area which also expe-
riences particularly low productivity growth. This area-speciﬁc productivity trend may
bias the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization upwards. To control for this bias, I check if there
are such diﬀerences across areas (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe+North America)
and, if so, I include interacted time-area dummies. Table D reports the number of obser-
vations with ﬁnancial liberalization reforms (rows 1-2), the number of country-years with
open capital markets (row 3), and the means of TPF growth and capital accumulation
across continents. Note from rows 1 and 2 that Africa, accounting for almost half of the
sample, has the least number of capital account reforms and a very bad performance in
terms of productivity growth. On the other hand, Europe and North America have the
highest incidence of unreverted capital account liberalizations, the best performance in
terms of productivity and the worst in capital accumulation. This suggest to control the
diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions for continental trends in both productivity and capital
accumulation.
A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens
up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is
already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive eﬀect to ﬁ-
nancial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased estimates.
As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the three or
ﬁve years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. Comparing the coeﬃcient for this
dummy with γ allows me to verify whether the change in P was part of a previous trend
or caused by liberalization. As a robustness check, I replace the dummy variable with a
trend variable, taking values 1, 2 and 3, respectively three, two and one years before the
reform. Moreover, I assess whether both reforms into and out of ﬁnancial liberalization
(opening when a country is closed and closing when a country is open) have the same
13eﬀect on economic performance. This allows me to assess the hypothesis that countries
adopt whatever reform for the sake of improving economic performance.
A concern about the consistency of diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimators may arise if the
dependent variable is autocorrelated, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). In this
case, the standard errors of the coeﬃcient γ would be underestimated, thereby biasing
the t-statistics towards over-rejection of the null γ =0 . Bertrand et al. (2004) propose
several methods to get around this problem. I will estimate equation (4) without IFL,
save the residuals only for the countries that experienced a reform, and regress them on
IFL.10 This is equivalent to identifying γ oﬀ the diﬀerence in the residuals before and after
the reform.
When investingating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness on TFP and capital in the long
run, I estimate the following growth regressions:
dpi(t−τ,t) = β0 + λpit−τ + β0
1Xi(t−τ,t) + γIFLi(t−τ,t) + δBCi(t−τ,t) + uit, (5)
where dpi(t−τ,t) =1 0 0
log(Pit)−log(Pit−τ)
τ with p ∈ {a,k}, P ∈ {A,K}, and the regressors
indexed by (t − τ, t) are τ-year period averages. A coeﬃcient estimate ˆ λ<0 indicates
that there is conditional convergence in productivity. The speed of convergence b can be
obtained from the deﬁnition of λ = −1001−ebτ
τ .Iﬁrst estimate equation (5) on a 25-year
cross section (τ= 25). As enphasized by the empirical growth literature, cross-sectional
estimates have several limits. They do not allow me to exploit the time-series variation in
the data, which is important to assess the eﬀects of reforms, such as ﬁnancial iberaliza-
tion; nor to control for omitted variables, country-speciﬁce ﬀects and endogeneity of the
regressors. In this case, addressing endogeneity with an instrumental variable strategy
looks rather diﬃcult. Legal origins may be a good instrument for ﬁnancial development
(see La Porta et al, 1997), but do not seem particularly suitable to instrument a variable
as IFL, which involves policy changes and perhaps reversals over the sample. Bekaert
et al. (2003) address the issue by separately estimating a probit for IFL,a n dﬁnd that
the quality of institutions is crucial in determining the choice of liberalization. But as the
institutional framework is known to be an important determinant of TFP (see, among
others, Hall and Jones, 1999), it does not seem a valid instrument for IFL, in a regression
for TFP.
I address the ﬁrst problem by turning to panel data. Note that the speciﬁcation of
equation (5) with uit = ηi+ νt+ εit includes the lagged dependent variable. It follows
that, even if εit is not correlated with pit−τ, the estimates are not consistent with a
10This procedure is referred to as “ignoring time series information” in Bertrand et al. (2004).
14ﬁnite time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other
explanatory variables, as in the cross-sectional estimates. To correct for the bias created by
lagged endogenous variables, and the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the approach
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). I estimate the
following system with GMM
dpit = β0 + θdpit−5 + β0
1dXit + γdIFLit + δdBCit + dνt + dεit (6)
pit = β0 + θpit−5 + β0
1Xi(t−5,t) + γIFLi(t−5,t) + δBCi(t−5,t) + ηi + νt + εit, (7)
where dpit equals log( Pit
Pit−5), and the other regressors are the same as in the previous equa-
tions. Levels indexed by (t − 5,t ) are ﬁve-year averages. ηi, νt and εit are respectively
the unobservable country- and time-speciﬁce ﬀects, and the error term, respectively. The
presence of country eﬀect in equation (7) corrects the omitted variable bias. The diﬀer-
ences in equation (6) and the instrumental variables estimation of the system are aimed at
amending inconsistency problems. I instrument diﬀerences of the endogenous and prede-
t e r m i n e dv a r i a b l e sw i t hl a g g e dl e v e l si ne q u a t i o n( 6 )a n dl e v e l sw i t hd i ﬀerenced variables
in equation (7). For instance, I take ait−15 as an instrument for dait−5 and IFLit−10 for
dIFLit in (6) and dait−10 as an instrument for ait−5 and dIFLit−5 for IFLit in (7). I
estimate the system by two-step Generalized Method of Moments with moment condi-
tions E[dait−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0 for s ≥ 2,a n dE[dzit−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0 for s ≥ 2 on
the predetermined variables z, for equation (6); E[dai,t−5s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 and E[dzi,t−5s
(ηi + εi,t) ]=0for s =1for equation (7). I treat all regressors as predetermined. The
validity of the instruments is guaranteed under the hypothesis that the residuals from (6)
are not second order serially correlated. Coeﬃcient estimates are consistent and eﬃcient
if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation are satisﬁed. To validate
the estimated model, I apply a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and a test of
second-order serial correlation of the residuals.11 As pointed out by Arellano and Bond
(1991), the estimates from the ﬁrst step are more eﬃcient, while the test statistics from
the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coeﬃcients and statistics from
the ﬁrst and second step respectively. Note that in this case the speed of convergence b
(divergence) obtains from θ = e5b.
11Including too many lags among the instruments can cause the power of the Sargan test to collapse,
potentially hiding the invalidity of instruments (see for example Bowsher, 2002). To avoid this problem, I
restrict the number of lags to t-10a n dt - 15.
155T h e r e s u l t s
5.1 Financial integration, banking crises and capital accumulation: D-i-D
Table 1 reports the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regessions of dk on yearly
data.12 The speciﬁcation in coulumn 1 only includes the indicators of ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion (IFL) and banking crises (BC), whose eﬀects on investments are nil and negative,
respectively. These coeﬃcients are robust to controlling for trends in investments up to
three years prior to liberalization (IFL_switch3) and for time-continent eﬀects, as reported
in column 2.13 Column 3 shows that banking crises have no diﬀerent eﬀect across ﬁnan-
cially open and restricted countries. When I control for real per capita GDP, government
expenditure as a ratio of GDP and credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP (column
4), IFL remains insigniﬁcant, while the negative coeﬃcient for BC becomes only mar-
ginally signiﬁcant (it is diﬀerent from zero at the ten per cent level). Note however that
its signiﬁcance is fully restored when any of the additional controls is removed from the
regression (result not reported). The coeﬃcients in column 4 show that richer countries
accumulate more capital, while government expenditure tends to crowd out investments.
The growth rate of physical capital is lower where ﬁnancial intermediation (as proxied by
privo) is higher and has grown less (the latter is not reported, but available upon request).
This suggests that countries invest more in physical capital when their ﬁnancial systems
are at early stages of development and growing rapidly. Columns 5 and 6 report the esti-
mates for the subsamples of developed and developing countries, as deﬁned by the World
Bank.14 Interestingly, capital account liberalization has a positive eﬀect on investments
in the developed countries, and no impact in the others. As in column 4, removing any
of the additional controls restores the negative coeﬃcient for BC,w i t h o u ta ﬀecting the
positive estimate for IFL in the developed countries. Finally, the results are robust to
the inclusion of openness to trade, whose coeﬃcient always turns out to be insigniﬁcant
a n di st h u so m i t t e d .
5.2 Financial integration, banking crises and productivity: D-i-D
Tables 2a and 2b report the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regessions of a on
yearly data. The coeﬃcients for IFL reported in Table 2a are positive and signiﬁcant
12The evidence is robust to the use of investments as a ratio of GDP as a proxy of the dependent variable.
The results are availablie upon request.
13The results do not change if I use IFL_switch5, which equals 1 for the ﬁve years prior to the reform.
14Heterogeneity in the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization could also be addressed by including an interacted
dummy IFL∗ developing in the full-sample regression. This method, however, may deliver biased estimates
if there is heterogeneity in other coeﬃcients.
16across all speciﬁcations in columns 1-5. Columns 6-7 though suggest that the positive
eﬀect is more pronounced in the developing countries. Banking crises have a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP under all speciﬁcations. Note that when I add intellectual
property rights protection among the regressors, twenty countries drop out of the sample
due to missing observations. Nevertheless, the estimates for IFLand BC in the equations
of columns 1-3 do not change if I restrict the sample. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients for privo
in columns 5-7 suggest that ﬁnancial development on average tends to have a positive eﬀect
on productivity. However, its eﬀect is positive in the developing countries and negative in
the developed ones. This result may support the hypothesis that ﬁnancial development
favors convergence in productivity. Notice that the coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial liberalization
and banking crises remain signiﬁcant, even after controlling for ﬁnancial development.
This suggest that both have a direct eﬀect on productivity. The coeﬃcient estimates for
ipr conﬁrm the expectations of a positive eﬀe c to nT F P ,m a i n l yi nt h ed e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e s
where R&D capacity is probably higher.
Table 2b reports robustness checks on the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimates of Table
2a, column 5. The ﬁrst two columns refer to the correction proposed by Bertand et al.
(2004). In column 1, I report the results from regressing TFP on all control variables
but IFL, country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial development and
intellectual property rights protection do not change with respect to Table 1.I s a v e d
the residuals from the estimation in column 1 only for the countries that experienced a
regime shift relative to IFL, and regressed them on IFL.T h ec o e ﬃcient and its standard
e r r o ri nc o l u m n2c o n ﬁrm that ﬁnancial integration raises signiﬁcantly, and by 8 per cent
productivity. In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify the eﬀect of a policy change from
ﬁnancial openness to restriction. In column 3, I restrict the attention to those countries
that were not closed all the time, and regress productivity on the usual controls plus
an indicator that takes value one if there is not ﬁnancial openness and zero otherwise.
In this way, the coeﬃcient quantiﬁes the change in TFP before and after the adoption
of restrictions in the countries that closed their ﬁnancial markets with the change in the
countries that remained open. The eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In column
4, I take the full sample and regress TFP on an indicator that equals 0 if a country is
open in a given year or if it is closed throughout the entire sample, and 1 otherwise. The
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for IFL_off suggests that productivity dropped in
countries that closed their ﬁnancial markets compared to the countries that were open
or remained closed ever. These results allow me to exclude that regime switches out of
ﬁnancial liberalization have not the same, positive eﬀect of switches into it. In columns 5-
7, I control in alternative ways for the pre-reform trends in TFP. In column 5 I decompose
17the dummy IFL_switch in two dummies for switches on and oﬀ liberalization. In column
6, these dummies are no longer step dummies, but take the form of a three-period linear
t r e n di nt h et h r e ey e a r sp r i o rt or e f o r m s .I nb o t hc a s e st h e i ri n t r o d u c t i o nd o e sn o ta ﬀect
the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial openness. Column 7 reports the result from
adding a pre-reform trend for each country that has liberalized. Again, no signiﬁcant
changes occur with respect to the other regressions.
5.3 TFP growth and capital accumulation in the long run
To evaluate the eﬀects on productivity growth and capital accumulation in the long run,
I perform cross-sectional estimations of the following equations:
dai(t−25,t) = β0 + λait−25 + β0
1Xi(t−25,t) + γIFLi(t−25,t) + δBCi(t−25,t) + εit
and
dki(t−25,t) = β0 + λkit−25 + β0
1Xi(t−25,t) + γIFLi(t−25,t) + δBCi(t−25,t) + εit
The regressors indexed by (t−25,t ) are expressed in twenty-ﬁve-year averages. It follows
that the estimates for γ and δ capture the eﬀects of the occurrence and length of ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises on the variable of interest. Period averages cannot,
though, discriminate between liberalizations and crises happening early and late in the
sample, nor between inerrupted and uninterrupted episodes delivering the same mean.
Table 3 shows that countries that start with a lower stock of capital experience a
higher rate of capital accumulation, other thing equal, since the coeﬃcients for k_25
are always negative and signiﬁcant. While capital account liberalization does not aﬀect
capital accumulation, equity market liberalization has a positive eﬀe c to ni tu n d e rs o m e
speciﬁcations. Banking crises tend to have a negative impact on the growth rate of capital.
The results in Table 4 support robustly the hypothesis of conditional convergence
in productivity, with an implied speed of convergence b between 1 and 2 per cent per
year.15 The eﬀect of banking crises on TFP growth is negative and signiﬁcant under
all speciﬁcations. Capital account liberalization has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
only under the basic speciﬁcation (column1), and has no diﬀerent eﬀect across countries
that experienced banking crises or and those that did not (column 2). The coeﬃcient
for at−25 ∗ IFL, aimed at assessing whether ﬁnancial liberalization aﬀects the pace of
convergence, is nil in column 3. Column 5 suggests that the institutional factors captured
15Remember that the speed of convergence is computed from λ = −100
1−e25b
25 .
18by GADP, together with initial productivity, are the most important determinant of TFP
growth. None of the other control variables seem to aﬀect productivity growth.
5.4 The dynamics of productivity and capital
The dynamic panel estimates in Table 5 conﬁrm the prediction of the neoclassical growth
model, that capital accumulation slows down as capital grows up towards its steady state
value, and also that there is conditional convergence across countries. The coeﬃcients for
ﬁnancial liberalization conﬁrm the result from the cross-sectional analysis. Banking crises
depress investments, though to a lesser extent in countries with high initial capital stocks.
T h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e6c o n ﬁrm the cross sectional evidence in favor of conditional
convergence in productivity. The implied speed of convergence is now higher and lies
between 1.2 and 4.4 per cent per year. Capital account liberalization spurs productivity
growth in a robust way, while the negative eﬀect of banking crises is now weaker. Trade
does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP growth. Columns 4-7 report the results
for the interactions of ﬁnancial liberalization with banking crises, and the interaction of
both IFL and BC with the level of economic development and the quality of institutions.
Column 4 shows that the eﬀects of neither international ﬁnancial liberalization nor banking
crises change with the initial level of productivity. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term
in column 5 suggest that the joint eﬀect of capital account liberalization and banking crises
harms productivity growth. Column 6 shows that BC lowers TFP growth everywhere,
while IFLhas positive eﬀects in developed and negative eﬀects in the developing countries.
The same holds in column 7, where I distinguish between countries with high and low
institutional quality, as measured by GADP. These results support the existence of a
robust positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on productivity.
The results above suggest that ﬁnancial liberalization has a positive direct eﬀect on
TFP but not on capital accumulation over a one to ﬁve year period. One can wonder
whether the eﬀect on capital accumulation may take longer to display, due, for instance
to the presence of adjustment costs. Table 7 reports results from estimating the system
(6)-(7) for capital, adding a lagged term of capital account liberalization. As reported
in column 2, ﬁnancial integration spurs capital accumulation with one period lag. Is
this lagged eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness a direct one or is it that investments rise as a
consequence of the increase in TFP? The estimates in column 3, where I add TFP to the
regessors of column 2, suggests that this is the case, since the coeﬃcient for IFLt−5 is no
longer signiﬁcant, while the one for TFP is positive and signiﬁcant.
195.5 Equity market liberalization
Finally, in Tables 8 and 9 I report the main results obtained when considering the indicator
of equity market liberalization by Bekaert et al. (2003) instead of the capital account
liberalization index. The positive eﬀects on TFP survive, but now also the positive eﬀects
on capital accumulation are signiﬁcant, at least under some speciﬁcations. This may
justify why the eﬀects of EML on growth are more signiﬁcant than those of IFL in the
estimates by Bekaert et al. (2003).
6 A simple model of financial globalization
Financial liberalization allows borrowers and lenders to access foreign capital markets and
to make use of foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries. In a world with market imperfections,
ﬁnancial services (such as screening, monitoring, debt structuring, etc.) can be seen as
an important factor of production for ﬁrms that need to raise external capital. To this
extent, ﬁnancial openness can be interpreted as integration in the market for ﬁnancial
services. Since the quality and varieties of ﬁnancial services are likely to diﬀer across
countries and sectors, ﬁnancial liberalization, by allowing trade, may generate the well
known gains from trade. Specialization allows ﬁrms in all countries to buy any given
ﬁnancial service at the best price, thereby raising TFP. Moreover, the access to new
varieties of services may provide ﬁrms with the most appropriate ﬁnancial instruments,
which spurs productivity. This rise in TFP is due to an increase in allocative eﬃciency,
which is empirically documented by Galindo et al. (2005). The increase in TFP is not
necessarily accompanied by capital ﬂows across countries, but is most probably followed
by capital accumulation, as the evidence in the previous sections suggest.
As another consequence of ﬁnancial liberalization and specialization in ﬁnancial ser-
vices, one should observe ﬁnancial intermediaries enter foreing markets following compar-
ative advantage patterns, as recent evidence from microdata shows. For instance, the
results in Focarelly and Pozzolo (2000) suggest that foreign banks entry more often in
countries where banks are less eﬃcients, and Clarke et al. (1999) show that they tend to
serve the sectors in which they have comparative advantage. Moreover, Claessens et al.
(2001)d o c u m e n ta no v e r a l le ﬃciency gain in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tb e t t e rﬁnancial services reduce the volatility in output (for in-
stance through eﬀective selection or monitoring of the borrowers), ﬁnancial integration
may reduce the volatility of aggregate production of a country. On the contrary, in the
models that see ﬁnancial globalization mainly as an international portfolio diversiﬁcaiton
device (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), ﬁnancial integration tends to promote risk taking at each
20single country level, which raises output volatility. Table 10 reports results from OLS
regressions of the 1980-1999 sample standard deviation of log-GDP on the growth rate of
GDP and the indicators of IFL and banking crises. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cients of IFL seem inconsistent with the prediction of ﬁnancial globalization raising output
volatility. The same holds for TFP in columns 5-8.
Financial integration may also generate frictional unemployment due to the realloca-
tion of capital from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms, as a consequence of the improvement in
the ﬁnancial services of screening and selection of borrowers. Looking at data on labor
and employment may be an interesting extension of the analysis in the present paper.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
A wide literature has focused on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on GDP growth, often
ﬁnding mixed results. To better understand the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization, however, it
is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper has attempted to
probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of ﬁnancial openness
on two sources of income growth: capital accumulation and productivity. Contrary to the
existing literature, I ﬁnd fairly robust results. In particular, ﬁnancial liberalization has a
positive direct eﬀect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some
delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise productivity.
In my analysis I took into account two possible indirect channels through which ﬁnan-
cial globalization may aﬀect economic performance: ﬁnancial development and banking
crises. The most interesting result applies to the latter factor. As expected, banking crises
have a strong negative impact on economic performance, though the likelihood that they
occur does not rise much under ﬁnancial integration. In fact, globalization raises only the
probability of minor crises in developed countries. Nevertheless, the positive direct eﬀect
of ﬁnancial liberalization on TFP survives.
The paper ﬁnally suggests an explanation for the positive direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial
integration on productivity. The main idea is that removing restrictions to international
ﬁnancial transaction opens the door to trade in ﬁnancial services, which can be considered
as a production factor. As in trade models, openness generates gains from specialization
a n dw i d e n i n go fv a r i e t i e s ,w h i c hr a i s ee ﬃciency in the allocation of capital in each and
every country, thereby fostering TFP growth. The mechanism is supported by some
existing evidence on the pattern of internationalization of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and on
the allocative eﬃciency of investments.
Developing a theoretical foundation of comparative advantage and diﬀerenciation in
ﬁnancial services, and testing it seems an interesting direction for future research.
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